To estimate the local effect of establishing land grant colleges, I compare locations that receive a land grant college to "runner-up" counties that were in contention to receive the land grant but did not for as-good-as-random reasons. I find that establishing a land grant college causes an increase in local invention, including in particular agricultural inventions, in college counties relative to the runner-up counties. But land grant college counties see only small and imprecisely estimated improvements in agricultural performance, measured by yield and output, relative to runner-up counties. I discuss several alternative interpretations of these findings. By comparing the establishment of land grant colleges to non-land grant colleges, I show that land grants appear to cause smaller increases in local invention, population, and agricultural output, but larger increases in agricultural yields and new crop varieties. The effect of land grant colleges on local innovations is largest, even relative to non-land grant colleges, following the passage of legislation that increases funding to agricultural research.
I Introduction
The U.S. land grant college system is frequently hailed as a major success of agricultural innovation policy (Wright, 2012) . To be sure, agriculture in both the U.S. and around the world has become massively more productive over the last 150 years. Moreover, many land grant college towns are now innovative hubs (Harrington and Sauter, 2018) and frequently top lists of best places to live (Im, 2019) . But to what extent are these facts caused by the presence of a land grant college, and how much is due to innate location fundamentals?
This questions is typically difficult to answer. Simply comparing places with land grant colleges to places without is unlikely to give the true causal effect of a college. Even more frustrating for researchers is that it is not clear in which direction this naive comparison is biased. On one hand, land grant colleges were likely established in up-and-coming regions, likely with access to natural amenities such as rivers to improve transportation and facilitate the diffusion of new ideas, suggesting that estimates of the effect of colleges is biased upwards.
On the other hand, land grants' focus on agriculture might have induced states to locate their colleges close to farmers and far from the major cities that would allow for the exploitation of agglomeration economies, implying a downward bias. Indeed, I show below that both of these factors were important when states were deciding where to locate their land grant colleges.
To overcome these challenges, I identify cases in which the location of colleges was determined essentially at random. This randomization ensures that estimates of the local effect of land grant colleges represent the true causal effect of the college. More specifically, I use the natural experiments introduced in Andrews (2019b), identifying "runner-up" counties that were strongly considered to become the site of a new college but were ultimately not selected for reasons that are as good as random assignment. The first contribution of this paper is to elaborate on these selection processes, providing detailed narrative evidence that the decisions were indeed essentially random for a number of land grant colleges.
Using the runner-up counties as counterfactuals for locations that received land grant colleges, I present a number of results. First, I show that establishing a land grant college causes more local innovation. Much of the research on the local effects of colleges on innovation, including Andrews (2019b) , uses patenting to proxy for innovation. 1 While I show that patenting does indeed increase near land grant colleges, this measure is less likely to serve as an effective proxy for innovations in agriculture since many agricultural improvements are not patentable. 2 I make some progress on this issue by using data on the location of origin of new U.S. wheat varieties introduced before 1920 (Clark, Martin, and Ball, 1922) .
While the data are much sparser than those for patents, even here I find that innovation increases in counties that receive land grant colleges relative to the runner-up counties. I find no evidence that land grant college counties increase their specialization in agricultural invention, measured by the share of county patents belonging to an agriculture class. While not precisely estimated, land grant colleges appear to cause an increase in county population as well, a factor that is likely to positively affect innovation but may dilute the focus on agriculture.
While land grant college counties cause sizable increases in local innovations relative to 1 See also Jaffe (1989) , Kantor and Whalley (2014) , and Hausman (2017) , for a few exemplary cases. 2 While asexually reproduced plants became eligible for protection under a plant patent in 1930, and both asexually and sexually reproduced plants became utility patent-eligible in the late 1980s, none of these methods were available at the time land grant colleges were established. See Moser and Rhode (2012) and Moscona (2019) for studies on the effects of patent protection laws for plants.
the runner-up counties, they have modest and imprecisely estimated effects on agricultural outcomes, including agricultural yields, total agricultural output, crop output, and livestock production. This overall finding, that land grant colleges cause sizable increases in local agricultural innovation but little increase in local agricultural output, could be interpreted either as evidence that innovations developed at land grant colleges are diffusing to the areas that will use them, or that the innovations developed at land grant colleges are irrelevant for agriculture within the state. More study is needed to distinguish between these interpretations and rule out alternative explanations.
To determine whether these observed outcomes are specific to land grant colleges, I compare my sample of land grant colleges to a sample of non-land grant colleges for which I am also able to identify runner-up locations. While measured imprecisely, land grant colleges appear to cause a smaller increase in local patenting, population, and urbanization than do other types of colleges. In terms of agricultural outcomes, the story is less clear: land grant colleges appear to cause a larger increase in local agricultural productivity relative to other types of colleges, but smaller increases in local agricultural output, and in most cases the magnitudes are small. In short, it is difficult to definitively conclude that land grant colleges play a unique role in promoting local agricultural innovation or output.
Finally, I attempt to get a sense of what drives the observed effectiveness of land grant colleges. Several pieces of legislation have been passed since the land grant college system was first established in 1862, each of which has affected land grant colleges and their role in agricultural innovation in different ways. I show that the difference in innovation between college and runner-up counties is largest following pieces of legislation that are explicitly targeted towards agricultural research, namely the 1887 Hatch Act and post-World War II federal funding programs, providing suggestive evidence that these laws had their intended effect. This finding is true even when comparing land grant colleges to non-land grant colleges to rule out college life-cycle effects. In sum, these historical natural experiments paint a picture in which explicit funding of agricultural research had large positive effects on the amount of measured agricultural innovation, but there is less clarity regarding how useful these innovations were or how widely they diffused. This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a rich description of the land grant college site selection experiments and describes the sample of colleges used in this paper. Section III presents the results and Section IV concludes.
II Land Grant College Site Selection Experiments
The main difficulty with attempting to estimate the causal effect of establishing an institution of higher education, including a land grant college, is that these institutions are not located at random. For instance, colleges were often located in up-and-coming areas that were more productive and innovative than other areas in the same state, and so comparing places that get colleges to these other locations will overstate the effect of a college. At the same time, many land grant colleges were located away from productive population centers with the belief that proximity to urban areas would distract students' from their learning. On a similar note, state officials frequently wanted to locate public universities close to the geographic center of the state so that they could be equally accessible to all; these concerns often trumped desires to locate colleges in more productive areas. Indeed, many land grant colleges appear to have been located so as to be, as one university president put it, "equally inaccessible from all parts" of the state (Dunaway, 1946, p. 14-15) . Hence, it is ex ante unclear whether college location decisions are likely to bias estimates of the effects of colleges upwards or downwards.
To overcome this challenge, I use the data and estimation strategy from Andrews (2019b) .
More specifically, I examine the historical record to find locations that were finalists to become the site of a new college, similar to the technique used to identify counterfactual locations for large manufacturing plants in Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) . I further restrict attention to cases in which the choice of the winning finalist site is as good as random assignment. I refer to the losing finalists as "runner-up" sites. Andrews (2019b) examines colleges of various types, while in this paper my primary goal is understanding the role of land grant colleges. 3
Andrews (2019b) provides a detailed overview of these natural experiments, including
showing that college and runner-up sites are observationally similar prior to establishing the college; showing that college and runner-up sites evolve along parallel trends prior to establishing the college; conducting numerous placebo tests; and describing qualitatively the site selection process, arguing that these decisions were fraught with randomness and unpredictability (see especially the Historical Appendix, Andrews (2019a)). I therefore take the opportunity here to describe several of these college site selection experiments in more detail than is possible in this other work, providing a deeper understanding of the kinds of historical contingencies at work while referring the reader to Andrews (2019b) (Geiger, 1958, p. 13-27) . In the empirical analysis below, I compare Fargo to Jamestown and Bismarck, the runner-up sites, to estimate the effect of the college. 5 One point worth emphasizing is that Jamestown and Bismarck looked very similar to Fargo prior to the establishment of NDSU and, as far as one can ascertain from the historical data, all had the climate, infrastructure, and temperament to successfully support a school. The point is not that the location of NDSU was random, but rather that it was random among the set of finalist locations. Thus, comparing Fargo to only the runner-up sites ensures that the comparison locations are good counterfactuals for Fargo. 4 The location of the University of North Dakota was also assigned randomly at the same time and in the same manner; see Section II.A below. 5 I do not consider Grand Forks as a runner-up site because it received an institution of higher education of its own. Including the few cases in which the "losing" sites receive a college does not meaningfully alter any results.
Of course, literal random assignment of college sites is rather rare. More common are cases in which states set out a number of criteria that any prospective site must meet, and then painstakingly surveyed areas for their suitability. Many "wannabe" locations were eliminated at this stage. Among the remaining candidate locations, a board of trustees or site selection committee would typically meet and debate. Finally, the decision would then come to a vote. These votes were often quite contentious. I consider a candidate location to be as good as randomly assigned if, following this process in which less suitable sites are eliminated, the vote between the winner and the loser is very close. This occurred, for instance, in the cases of the University of Maine (Smith, 1979) , the University of Nevada (Doten, 1924) , Clemson University (Reel, 2011) , and the University of Tennessee (Montgomery, Folmsbee, and Greene, 1984) .
The University of California Davis provides an example of a typical site selection process.
Berkeley was originally the location of California's only land grant college, but from the very beginning critics complained that Berkeley was not climatically representative of the rest of the state and so was a poor site for agricultural research. 6 In 1905, the California state legislature voted to establish a model farm operated independently of the Berkeley campus.
The site selection commission was overwhelmed by more 70 offers from around the state.
When narrowing down the sites, the commission set the following criteria:
The farm site should lie within the central portion of the state, in close proximity to a main railroad line, with easy access to good service; its soils should consist largely of medium loam not subject to flooding or under a level; an irrigation 6 The original location of California's land grant college was selected because it was close to San Francisco but far enough away to avoid distractions. The trustees settled on Berkeley only after planned land purchases in neighboring counties fell through (Ferrier, 1930, p. 157-214) . system should already be in place; and the proposed property should be situated within the vicinity of a clean and progressive town. Additionally, [the commission] thought the site ought optimally to represent the state's "typical" rainfall and general agriculture (i.e., irrigated crops) and avoid extreme heat or other insalubrious conditions. (Scheuring, 2001, p. 18) As this quote demonstrates, representative climatic conditions and infrastructure to support farming were often explicit criteria when deciding land grant locations, providing confidence that winning and runner-up sites are likely similar in terms of their suitability for agriculture.
Given the parameters of this refined search, the California commission was left with four finalist locations in Davis, Walnut Creek, Suisun, and Woodland. Although final votes among these finalists are not known, the final meeting to select among these sites dragged on for hours, highlighting just how contentious the decision was. Davis was selected only after speculators tripled the price of land at the commission's first choice. The farm was officially established in 1906 and would become an full-fledged agricultural college in 1921.
The other way in which land grant college sites were often selected was through an auction-like process. Based on the prevailing interpretation of the 1862 Morrill Act, states could use their land grant endowment to fund the operating expenses of agricultural colleges, but could not use them for purchasing land or erecting buildings. If a state wanted to create a new agricultural college from scratch, they often solicited bids from localities in the state. I consider the college site to be as-good-as-randomly assigned if candidates' bids are known and the winning bid is very similar to that of losing candidates. These close bidding processes are typically also followed by a contentious vote among a site selection committee.
These auction-type processes occur for schools such as the University of Arkansas (Reynolds and Thomas, 1910) , the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Turner (1932 ), Solberg (1968 ), Iowa State University (Ross, 1958) , the Missouri University of Science & Technology (Roberts, 1946) , and the University of Missouri (Rees and Walsworth (1989) , Burnes (2014) ).
In many cases, the decision of where to locate a college was not only contentious among a site selection committee, but among the residents of the state as well. The University of Florida provides such an example. In 1905, the state of Florida had eight small institutions of higher education scattered across the state. In an effort to consolidate, the legislature passed the Buckman Act, which closed the existing institutions, re-evaluated the best locations, and then re-established the college at a potentially new site. Gainesville and Lake City quickly emerged as the clear frontrunners to become the new site of the college. Lake City had the added distinction of being the site of the previous Florida Agricultural College. Both Gainesville and Lake City submitted bids of similar amounts, and when it came time for the Board of Control of the university system to vote on the matter, Gainesville won over Lake City, six to four, following a contentious debate. But as acrimonious as the vote was, it paled in comparison to the views of the citizens of Lake City: as materials from the former agricultural college were being packed to move to their new home in Gainesville, they were done so under an armed guard for fear of rioting (Proctor and Langley, 1986, 18-26) .
In still other cases, unusual "fluky" events proved decisive in determining the location of land grant colleges. The establishment of Cornell University (New York's land grant college and the only private land grant institution) provides such an example. What would become Cornell University was originally intended to be located at the People's College in Havana, New York, but the state senator sponsoring the bill suffered an ill-timed stroke, delaying the decision. Later, the legislature was strongly considering placing the college in Ovid when a well-known advocate for the compassionate treatment of the insane died mid-speech before the state assembly in Albany. State senators Andrew White and Ezra Cornell were able to use the death to convince the legislature that Ovid should receive an insane asylum instead of a college. Satisfied with the arrangement, Ovid's representatives then decided to support whatever location White and Cornell decided to endorse, creating a dominant legislative coalition (Bishop (1962) , Kammen (2003) ). Even then, the decision was not settled: White and Cornell each wanted to place the college in their hometowns, with White being from Syracuse and Cornell from Ithaca. But Cornell adamantly refused to allow the college to be located in Syracuse, because as a young man he had been "robbed [there] not once but twice" (Kammen, 2003 (Kammen, , p. 2003 ; White and Cornell settled on Ithaca instead.
Other colleges provide further examples of serendipity determining a school's location.
Louisiana State University moved to Baton Rouge after its prior location burned down, and only a few sites in the state had the infrastructure to take on the school on short notice (Fleming, 1936) . There are even accounts (possibly apocryphal) that the location of Texas Agricultural and Mechanical University was decided by a poker game (Dethloff, 1975, p. 18 )! Even acts of God intervened to determine college location. In 1885, Arizona's famous (or infamous) "Thieving Thirteenth" legislature met to divvy up the territory's state institutions.
The citizens of Tucson had their hearts set on obtaining the state insane asylum when they set off for the legislative assembly in Prescott. But flooding on the Salt River delayed the Tucson delegates, and when they arrived in Prescott the insane asylum had already been spoken for. The people of Tucson were stuck with the state's land grant college, which became the University of Arizona (Martin (1960, p. 21-25) , Wagoner (1970, p. 194-222) , Cline (1983, p. 2-4) ).
As these examples illustrate, the narrative historical record contains rich details about both the locations that received land grant colleges and those that were strongly considered but ultimately did not. Some of these details suggest variation that may be useful for additional analysis. For example, in the case of North Dakota State and the University of Arizona, the "losing towns" that did not receive the land grant college received another type of institution instead. Likewise, in the case of Cornell University, Ovid received an insane asylum in lieu of the land grant college. Syracuse, another runner-up for Cornell University, did not receive any other institution at the time Cornell was established, but did receive a university of its own within a few decades. In this paper, I abstract from these issues, but I discuss them in some detail in Andrews (2019b) . Analysis of other types of heterogeneity, such as exploring more finely differences across types of institutions, geography, or other local conditions, may be of interest for future work. All of this is possible using the details available in the narrative record.
II.A Non-Land Grant Colleges
Similar strategies can be used to determine runner-up locations for non-land grant colleges as well. As mentioned above, North Dakota drew lots to determine the location of its flagship public university, the University of North Dakota, as well as its land grant college. In the case of the Georgia Institute of Technology, 24 rounds of balloting were required before Atlanta was selected over Macon (McMath Jr., Bayor, Brittain, Foster, Giebelhaus, and Reed, 1985, p. 24-32) . For Southern Arkansas University, eight rounds of balloting were required (Willis, 2009, p. 21-43) , and the University of Mississippi took seven (Sansing, 1999, p. 1-24) . 7 Auction-like processes and other "fluky" events are likewise common for the non-land grant colleges.
In this paper, I use non-land grant colleges as a set of "control institutions" to gain a sense of whether or not the effects I observe from establishing land grant colleges are caused by policies specifically related to land grants or whether they are common to all institutions of higher education. Appendix A lists more details about the sample of non-land grant colleges used in this paper.
II.B The Sample of Colleges
In total, there are 29 cases in which the site selection decision for a land grant college was as-good-as random, representing 55% of the 53 non-HBCU U.S. land grant institutions. As in Andrews (2019b) , all results in this paper are robust to dropping individual colleges or types of site selection decisions. Table 1 list each of these 29 colleges, the winning county of each, the runner-up counties, and the year in which the college is established. Throughout this paper, I define the year in which a college is established to be the year in which the college site is selected as described in the college site selection experiments above. In some cases, this date is not the same as the date in which an institution was formally founded, nor need it coincide with the date at which the college opened its doors.
Results are unchanged when using the first year when students attended or the first year (2018); population data come from the National Historical Geographic Information System (Manson, Schroeder, Riper, and Ruggles, 2018) ; and all agricultural data comes from agricultural censuses, cleaned and compiled by Haines, Fishback, and Rhode (2018) . For the population and agricultural data that comes from federal census data, I linearly interpolate values for all between-census years; unless otherwise noted, results are not sensitive to alternative interpolation approaches or to only using data from census years.
III Results
These four pictures tell the main story of this chapter: counties that receive a land grant college see a measurable increase in local invention, especially after about five decades. There is weak and noisy evidence that land grant colleges also cause increases in population, a major driver of local invention for the larger sample of colleges considered in Andrews (2019b) . But the counties that receive land grant colleges see no clear increase in agricultural productivity or output relative to the runners-up; while the agricultural measures fluctuate over time, these fluctuations are typically common to both the college and runner-up counties. Table 3 confirms these results in a regression framework. I estimate the simple differencesin-differences model:
(1)
LandGrantCounty i is an indicator variable equal to one for the counties that receive land counties. Column 2 specifically examines patents classified as agricultural according to the NBER patent classification system (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001) . While the estimated coefficient is positive, it is imprecisely estimated and much smaller in magnitude than overall patenting, at a roughly nine log point increase in agricultural patents per year. Column 3
shows that there is no significant change in the fraction of agricultural patents in land grant college counties after establishing a new college. 8
One challenge with measuring agricultural innovation is that many important breakthroughs, particularly the development of new and improved crop varieties, are not patented (Olmstead and Rhode, 2008) . 9 To provide some insight into the location of non-patented agricultural invention, I consult a USDA technical report (Clark et al., 1922) Even setting aside data concerns, the large positive coefficients for local innovation outcomes and small-in-magnitude and statistically insignificant coefficients for agricultural outcomes lend themselves to several possible interpretations. One interpretation is that the agricultural innovations documented in Panel (a) of Table 3 successfully diffuse throughout the land grant college's state, so the county from which these innovations originated saw little benefit from them relative to the otherwise similar runner-up counties. Alternatively, the results could be interpreted as evidence that the innovations developed in land grant college counties are irrelevant to agricultural production in the state, or that the agricultural outcome measures are mismeasuring true agricultural productivity. Much more work 12 The agricultural results here present one case in which interpolation meaningfully alters point estimates. When using only data from agricultural census years, the coefficients for agricultural productivity, agricultural output, and crop output are all smaller in magnitude, and the coefficient on agricultural output becomes negative. These results are available upon request.
is needed to conclusively determine which of these interpretations is most correct. I next test the difference between the types of colleges more formally in a triple differences framework. I estimate
III.A Comparing Land Grant Colleges to Other Types of Colleges
where CollegeCounty i is a dummy equal to one if county i ever receives a college of any type, P ostCollege it is a dummy equal to one in years t after the establishment of the college for which county i was either the winner or runner-up, and LandGrant i is a dummy equal to one if i was either the winner or runner-up for a land grant college.
I present results in Table 4 , for the same outcome variables as measured in Table 3 . however, since the non-land grant runner-up counties may be exposed to innovations from a nearby land grant college, and vice versa. A full exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
III.B What Pieces of Land Grant Legislation Were Most Effective?
The current land grant college system is the result of several pieces of legislation, from the 1862 Morrill Act to the most recent farm bill, each of which affected the local innovation ecosystem in different ways. To speak of "the effect" of land grant colleges is therefore to obscure many distinctions that may be important for policymakers. As a first pass at understanding which pieces of legislation had the largest local effect, I repeat the basic differencesin-differences analysis from above, but define multiple "post-period" dummy variables that are equal to one during time periods that denote given legislative epochs. I examine the difference between land grant college counties and runner-up counties following the initial establishment of land grant colleges under the Morrill Act of 1862, the establishment of agricultural experiment stations following the Hatch Act of 1887, and the post-World War II era in which the federal government became much more directly involved in research funding, exemplified by the 1946 Research and Marketing Act. 15 Each of these dates marks a commonly-recognized turning point in the funding of higher education, particularly in relation to agricultural research. Numerous studies highlight the pioneering role of the 1862 Morrill Act in establishing institutions dedicated to agricultural education and research, including several full-length histories (Edmond (1978) , Cross (1999, p. 77-94) , Geiger and 15 Many other important pieces of legislation could be studied as well, such as the Second Morrill Act of 1890 that established additional land grant colleges, especially for African Americans; the 1906 Adams Act that provided additional federal funding for scientific research; the 1925 Purnell Act that provided federal funding for applied research to aid the local agricultural sector; or the 1935 Bankhead-Jones Act, which introduced formula funding and federal and state matching grants for basic agricultural research. Alston and Pardey (1996) provide a useful summary of major legislation related to agricultural research. In additional untabulated analysis, I consider the effects of these other pieces of legislation as well. Unfortunately, many of the acts occurred within a decade or two of one another, making it extremely difficult to determine the effects of particular laws. I therefore focus on what I consider the most important changes in legislation, with the caveat that more additional research is needed to conclusively determine the effects of each policy.
Sorber (2013), Sorber (2018)). A sizable literature also examines the effects of the 1887
Hatch Act, which established state agricultural experiment stations and provided federal funding to conduct research at those stations, marking the beginning of direct federal funding of agricultural research activities (Kerr (1987) , Ferleger (1990) , Hillison (1996) , Kantor and Whalley (2019) ). The 1946 Research and Marketing Act, which dramatically increased federal spending on state agricultural experiment stations and reorganized the administration of federal agricultural research support, has been the least examined by historians of agriculture or education, although it has not been completely ignored (Bowers (1946) , Alston and Pardey (1996)). More broadly, the 1946 Act exemplifies the federal government's changing approach in the postwar world, with the end of World War II widely recognized as a watershed moment in the federal government's support for university research (Geiger (1993) , Rosenberg and Nelson (1994) , Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) , Mowery and Sampat (2001) ).
I estimate the following model:
where P ostM orrilAct equals one for 1862 ≤ t < 1887, P ostHatchAct equals one for 1887 ≤ t < 1946, and P ostW orldW arII equals one for 1946 ≤ t. 16 I focus on the first cohort of land grant colleges, established between 1862 and 1870, to see how a constant set of colleges changes over the lifecycle. 16 Results are similar when replacing the year fixed effects with the much coarser time period dummies for P ostM orrilAct, P ostHatchAct, and P ostW orldW arII. Table 5 . When splitting up the patenting results into four time periods (the pre-period before 1862 Morrill Act, which is the base time, and the time periods corresponding to each of the three interaction terms), individual coefficients are typically not statistically significant. It appears that the college counties only begin to see larger levels of patenting relative to the runners-up after the passage of the Hatch Act, with an even larger increase observed after World War II. Agricultural patenting, however, exhibits a different pattern, with the increase in the level of agricultural patents increasing in college counties relative to runners-up immediately following the passage of the Morrill Act while falling to almost zero following the Hatch Act and finally rebounding after World War II. The fraction of agricultural patents appears to increase in land grant college counties relative to the runners-up after the Morrill and Hatch Acts, but decreases after World War II, although the post-World War II magnitude is small. 17 Population and urbanization exhibit increases in college counties relative to the runners-up that are large in magnitude following World War II: total population increases by a statistically significant 54 log points, with urbanization increases by nine log points. Total population shows a sizable eleven log point increase following the Hatch Act as well. For agricultural productivity, agricultural output, and crop output, the land grant college counties see a decrease relative to the runner-up counties following the Morrill and Hatch Acts before seeing increases after World War II, although most of these coefficients are fairly small in magnitude, with magnitudes between two and thirteen log points. Livestock products actually exhibit the largest increase in college counties relative to the runners-up in the years following the Morrill Act, making it difficult to tell a consistent story about the role of each piece of legislation on local agricultural outcomes.
I present results in
While suggestive, interpreting the results in Table 5 is difficult. New colleges began as very small institutions that then grew over time, raising the possibility that larger differences between the college and runner-up counties after 1887 or 1946 are driven by the "natural" growth of these colleges rather than by specific policies. To attempt to account for this, I compare the effect of the 1862-1870 land grant colleges to the effect of other types of colleges that were established between 1860 and 1870. 
(4)
The 
IV Conclusion
In this paper, I provide detailed descriptions of the processes through which states decided where to locate their land grant colleges. Serendipity frequently played a role in determining college location, and I exploit this fact to identify runner-up sites that would have received land grant colleges but for as-good-as-random reasons.
Using these runner-up sites as counterfactuals for locations that receive a land grant college, I show that establishing a land grant college causes more local agricultural innovation, measured both by patents and new crop varieties. While land grant colleges cause an increase in innovation, they cause small and imprecisely estimated improvements in agricultural performance relative to the runner-up counties. These results lend themselves to several interpretations. One interpretation is that innovations developed at land grant colleges diffuse effectively, but it could also be the case that land grant college innovations 19 One may worry that only a few federal institutions dominated postwar federal funding, and that these institutions are missing from my sample. O'Mara (2005) , for example, documents how skewed federal funding was across institutions. While MIT and Stanford are not in my sample, Georgia Tech (which would increase its share of federal funding in the 1960s and 1970s) is included as a non-land grant college.
have limited relevance to farmers working within the same state. Additional research is needed to determine how the diffusion process for land grant innovations operates. Kantor and Whalley (2019) provide a promising first step in this direction, focusing on the role of geographic proximity and communications technologies in explaining the diffusion from land grant colleges, but much work remains to be done.
More work is also needed to understand exactly what types of policies led to the success of the land grant program, and which of these policies can be replicated in other contexts or with other types of institutions. In this paper I present suggestive evidence that the Hatch Act and post-World War II federal funding, both of which provided direct federal support for agricultural research, were particularly effective in promoting local invention.
Limited variation in the implementation of similar large scale policies makes these types of questions difficult to answer today. While the historical evidence presented in this paper is not conclusive, my hope is that the data and methodology presented here will prove to be of continuing utility in addressing important questions for agricultural innovation policy. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Notes: Differences-in-differences regression results comparing land grant college counties to runner-up counties before and after establishing each college. Panel (a) uses innovation and population outcomes as the dependent variables. Panel (b) uses agricultural yield and output as the dependent variables. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Notes: Differences-in-differences regression results comparing land grant college counties to runner-up counties before and after several major land grant-related pieces of legislation for the cohort of colleges established before 1870. Panel (a) uses innovation and population outcomes as the dependent variables. Panel (b) uses agricultural yield and output as the dependent variables. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Notes: Triple differences regression results comparing college counties to runner-up counties before and after establishing each college for land grant and non-land grant colleges. Panel (a) uses innovation and population outcomes as the dependent variables. Panel (b) uses agricultural yield and output as the dependent variables. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Notes: Triple differences regression results comparing college counties to runner-up counties before and after several major land grant-related pieces of legislation for the cohort of land grant and non-land grant colleges established between 1860 and 1870. Panel (a) uses innovation and population outcomes as the dependent variables. Panel (b) uses agricultural yield and output as the dependent variables. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Notes: Triple differences regression results comparing college counties to runner-up counties before and after several major land grant-related pieces of legislation for the cohort of land grant and non-land grant colleges established between 1860 and 1870. Panel (a) uses innovation and population outcomes as the dependent variables. Panel (b) uses agricultural yield and output as the dependent variables. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
